Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Arthur N. Prior and Jerrold J. Katz

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


16 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz]
Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
We need to know the meaning of 'and', prior to its role in reasoning [Prior,AN, by Belnap]
Prior's 'tonk' is inconsistent, since it allows the non-conservative inference A |- B [Belnap on Prior,AN]
Prior rejected accounts of logical connectives by inference pattern, with 'tonk' his absurd example [Prior,AN, by Read]
Maybe introducing or defining logical connectives by rules of inference leads to absurdity [Prior,AN, by Hacking]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
'Thank goodness that's over' is not like 'thank goodness that happened on Friday' [Prior,AN]