Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Bernard Bolzano and Paul Boghossian

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26 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
7807 The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
6345 Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
9987 An aggregate in which order does not matter I call a 'set' [Bolzano]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
9618 Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
10856 A truly infinite quantity does not need to be a variable [Bolzano]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
9830 Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17265 Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9185 Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett]
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
22276 Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
17264 Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
12232 A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
12233 The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano]
17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]