Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh and E Conee / R Feldman

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24 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
18405 A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
19525 If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
19524 We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs [Conee/Feldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19518 Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence [Conee/Feldman]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
18422 Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
18425 We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
18421 Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
18419 Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
18404 It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever]
18426 All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever]
18427 If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever]
18428 You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever]
18429 Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever]
18407 Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
18413 Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
18417 Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
18408 Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever]
18414 Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever]
18423 All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
18406 The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever]
18411 It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
18420 We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
19519 Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman]