Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Carlo Rovelli and Kent Bach

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39 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach]
If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach]
Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli]
There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli]
The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli]
Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli]