13 ideas
10365 | We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J] |
8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |
8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
18432 | Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards] |
8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |
8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
18434 | That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
4785 | Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos] |
8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |
8408 | Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley] |