13 ideas
| 3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
| 3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
| 19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
| 3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
| 3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
| 3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
| 19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
| 3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
| 3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
| 3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
| 19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |