13 ideas
| 19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
| 9470 | Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C] |
| 13418 | The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C] |
| 9469 | Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C] |
| 9468 | On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C] |
| 17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
| 19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
| 18201 | General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C] |
| 13419 | If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C] |
| 13417 | If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C] |
| 19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |