90 ideas
| 19579 | The history of philosophy is just experiments in how to do philosophy [Novalis] |
| 19583 | Philosophy only begins when it studies itself [Novalis] |
| 22026 | Philosophy is homesickness - the urge to be at home everywhere [Novalis] |
| 19588 | The highest aim of philosophy is to combine all philosophies into a unity [Novalis] |
| 19598 | Philosophy relies on our whole system of learning, and can thus never be complete [Novalis] |
| 19586 | Philosophers feed on problems, hoping they are digestible, and spiced with paradox [Novalis] |
| 19587 | Philosophy aims to produce a priori an absolute and artistic world system [Novalis] |
| 19574 | If man sacrifices truth he sacrifices himself, by acting against his own convictions [Novalis] |
| 14713 | Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent [Chalmers] |
| 19571 | Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis] |
| 19597 | Logic (the theory of relations) should be applied to mathematics [Novalis] |
| 19581 | A problem is a solid mass, which the mind must break up [Novalis] |
| 19584 | Whoever first counted to two must have seen the possibility of infinite counting [Novalis] |
| 22025 | Novalis thought self-consciousness cannot disclose 'being', because we are temporal creatures [Novalis, by Pinkard] |
| 2392 | Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers] |
| 2393 | Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2394 | Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2398 | Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 16048 | Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K] |
| 2401 | All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers] |
| 19575 | Refinement of senses increasingly distinguishes individuals [Novalis] |
| 16424 | Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers] |
| 16425 | Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers] |
| 16426 | How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers] |
| 13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
| 13963 | Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers] |
| 16473 | Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker] |
| 19258 | Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya] |
| 2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
| 2390 | We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers] |
| 22067 | Poetry is true idealism, and the self-consciousness of the universe [Novalis] |
| 14712 | A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false [Chalmers] |
| 2397 | 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers] |
| 2422 | The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers] |
| 19572 | Experiences tests reason, and reason tests experience [Novalis] |
| 19590 | Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis] |
| 19594 | General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 2396 | Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers] |
| 2426 | Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers] |
| 2391 | Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers] |
| 2412 | Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2386 | Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers] |
| 2416 | What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2423 | Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers] |
| 2403 | Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2400 | Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers] |
| 2389 | Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers] |
| 2419 | Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers] |
| 2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |
| 2415 | In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers] |
| 19591 | Desire for perfection is an illness, if it turns against what is imperfect [Novalis] |
| 2414 | When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers] |
| 2409 | Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers] |
| 2411 | Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers] |
| 2424 | It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 19596 | The whole body is involved in the formation of thoughts [Novalis] |
| 2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| 2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
| 2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
| 2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
| 2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
| 19573 | The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis] |
| 2429 | Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers] |
| 18403 | Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers] |
| 19577 | Everything is a chaotic unity, then we abstract, then we reunify the world into a free alliance [Novalis] |
| 14708 | Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter] |
| 13958 | The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers] |
| 2399 | Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers] |
| 13959 | The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers] |
| 13957 | Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 13961 | We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers] |
| 14739 | 'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider] |
| 13962 | Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers] |
| 13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 19585 | Every person has his own language [Novalis] |
| 19578 | Only self-illuminated perfect individuals are beautiful [Novalis] |
| 19582 | Morality and philosophy are mutually dependent [Novalis] |
| 22027 | Life isn't given to us like a novel - we write the novel [Novalis] |
| 19589 | The whole point of a monarch is that we accept them as a higher-born, ideal person [Novalis] |
| 19580 | If the pupil really yearns for the truth, they only need a hint [Novalis] |
| 19593 | Persons are shaped by a life history; splendid persons are shaped by world history [Novalis] |
| 19595 | Nature is a whole, and its individual parts cannot be wholly understood [Novalis] |
| 19592 | The basic relations of nature are musical [Novalis] |
| 16427 | Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers] |
| 19576 | Religion needs an intermediary, because none of us can connect directly to a godhead [Novalis] |