140 ideas
| 11832 | We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins] |
| 16512 | Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins] |
| 11863 | (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins] |
| 17529 | Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins] |
| 17530 | The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins] |
| 14746 | What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins] |
| 16523 | Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins] |
| 16524 | Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins] |
| 16526 | Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins] |
| 12056 | An ancestral relation is either direct or transitively indirect [Wiggins] |
| 12050 | Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins] |
| 16492 | Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins] |
| 16493 | Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins] |
| 11900 | We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins] |
| 11870 | Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins] |
| 16496 | Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins] |
| 11866 | The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins] |
| 12052 | We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins] |
| 13128 | 'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins] |
| 16495 | The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins] |
| 16501 | In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins] |
| 16506 | Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins] |
| 12055 | Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins] |
| 12059 | A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins] |
| 12063 | Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins] |
| 12051 | If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins] |
| 12053 | 'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins] |
| 12054 | Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins] |
| 11896 | A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 15835 | Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 11841 | The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins] |
| 10679 | 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack] |
| 14363 | Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 14364 | A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 11851 | Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins] |
| 11865 | The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins] |
| 12047 | We refer to persisting substances, in perception and in thought, and they aid understanding [Wiggins] |
| 14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| 11852 | Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins] |
| 11875 | Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins] |
| 12057 | Matter underlies things, composes things, and brings them to be [Wiggins] |
| 14749 | Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider] |
| 11844 | If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins] |
| 11861 | We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins] |
| 16509 | Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins] |
| 11871 | Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins] |
| 11879 | Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
| 16514 | Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins] |
| 16510 | Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins] |
| 11835 | The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins] |
| 16503 | 'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins] |
| 11876 | It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins] |
| 16499 | A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins] |
| 16515 | A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins] |
| 11858 | The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins] |
| 16517 | Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins] |
| 11843 | Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins] |
| 11864 | Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins] |
| 16498 | Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins] |
| 11831 | The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
| 16497 | Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins] |
| 16502 | Identity is primitive [Wiggins] |
| 14362 | Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 11838 | Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins] |
| 11847 | To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins] |
| 16521 | A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins] |
| 16505 | By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins] |
| 11839 | Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins] |
| 11845 | Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
| 16494 | We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins] |
| 16522 | It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins] |
| 11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
| 11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
| 16525 | Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 12064 | The category of substance is more important for epistemology than for ontology [Wiggins] |
| 12049 | Naming the secondary substance provides a mass of general information [Wiggins] |
| 11848 | Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins] |
| 12065 | Seeing a group of soldiers as an army is irresistible, in ontology and explanation [Wiggins] |
| 11859 | The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins] |
| 16518 | We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins] |
| 11836 | We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins] |
| 16511 | A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins] |
| 19956 | True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu] |
| 19961 | Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu] |
| 19962 | Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu] |
| 19963 | People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu] |
| 20008 | People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu] |
| 19993 | In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu] |
| 19992 | In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu] |
| 20005 | The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu] |
| 19995 | All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu] |
| 19964 | The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu] |
| 19986 | Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu] |
| 19972 | The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu] |
| 19974 | Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu] |
| 19976 | Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu] |
| 19978 | In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu] |
| 19985 | In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu] |
| 19988 | A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu] |
| 19977 | Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu] |
| 20007 | Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu] |
| 19975 | Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu] |
| 19989 | The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu] |
| 19970 | If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu] |
| 19971 | Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu] |
| 19984 | Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu] |
| 19980 | If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu] |
| 19996 | A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu] |
| 19997 | The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu] |
| 19965 | The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu] |
| 19968 | It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu] |
| 19969 | Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu] |
| 19999 | All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu] |
| 19967 | In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu] |
| 19966 | A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu] |
| 19998 | If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu] |
| 20003 | Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu] |
| 20000 | Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu] |
| 20006 | The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu] |
| 20009 | Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu] |
| 19994 | Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu] |
| 19981 | No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu] |
| 19991 | Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu] |
| 19990 | Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu] |
| 19983 | Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu] |
| 19982 | Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu] |
| 19959 | Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu] |
| 19960 | Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu] |
| 20002 | The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu] |
| 20010 | If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu] |
| 20001 | The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu] |
| 19973 | The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu] |
| 19987 | Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu] |
| 20011 | Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu] |
| 20004 | French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu] |
| 19979 | In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu] |
| 19957 | Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu] |
| 11860 | Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins] |
| 19958 | Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu] |