17 ideas
14759 | A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad] |
11842 | If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad] |
14963 | Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad] |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
8160 | The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett] |
14609 | We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad] |
22933 | We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad] |