31 ideas
| 8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| 8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
| 19284 | Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn] |
| 14629 | If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn] |
| 14529 | If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| 6451 | Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn] |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| 8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| 8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
| 8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
| 8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
| 8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
| 2866 | A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 23996 | Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn] |
| 11911 | Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn] |
| 2864 | The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn] |
| 2865 | Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn] |
| 23223 | The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn] |
| 8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
| 8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
| 8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |