Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Francis Bacon and Alex Orenstein

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is like a statue which is worshipped but never advances [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon]
Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Only individual bodies exist [Bacon]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
In hylomorphism all the explanation of actions is in the form, and the matter doesn't do anything [Bacon]
There are only individual bodies containing law-based powers, and the Forms are these laws [Bacon]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
The senses deceive, but also show their own errors [Bacon]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon]
Empiricists are collecting ants; rationalists are spinning spiders; and bees do both [Bacon]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon]
Nature is revealed when we put it under pressure rather than observe it [Bacon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science must clear away the idols of the mind if they are ever going to find the truth [Bacon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Stripped and passive matter is just a human invention [Bacon]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Even without religion, there are many guides to morality [Bacon]