Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, George Cantor and Georges Rey

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119 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Trying to represent curves, we study arbitrary functions, leading to the ordinals, which produces set theory [Cantor, by Lavine]
Cantor developed sets from a progression into infinity by addition, multiplication and exponentiation [Cantor, by Lavine]
A set is a collection into a whole of distinct objects of our intuition or thought [Cantor]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
Cantor's Theorem: for any set x, its power set P(x) has more members than x [Cantor, by Hart,WD]
Cantor proved that all sets have more subsets than they have members [Cantor, by Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
If a set is 'a many thought of as one', beginners should protest against singleton sets [Cantor, by Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Cantor showed that supposed contradictions in infinity were just a lack of clarity [Cantor, by Potter]
The continuum is the powerset of the integers, which moves up a level [Cantor, by Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Cantor gives informal versions of ZF axioms as ways of getting from one set to another [Cantor, by Lake]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / d. Axiom of Unions III
The Axiom of Union dates from 1899, and seems fairly obvious [Cantor, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / b. Combinatorial sets
Cantor's sets were just collections, but Dedekind's were containers [Cantor, by Oliver/Smiley]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars [Rey]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
There are infinite sets that are not enumerable [Cantor, by Smith,P]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / b. Cantor's paradox
Cantor's Paradox: the power set of the universe must be bigger than the universe, yet a subset of it [Cantor, by Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / e. Mirimanoff's paradox
The powerset of all the cardinal numbers is required to be greater than itself [Cantor, by Friend]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Cantor named the third realm between the finite and the Absolute the 'transfinite' [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Cantor proved the points on a plane are in one-to-one correspondence to the points on a line [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Cantor took the ordinal numbers to be primary [Cantor, by Tait]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
Cantor presented the totality of natural numbers as finite, not infinite [Cantor, by Mayberry]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Cantor introduced the distinction between cardinals and ordinals [Cantor, by Tait]
Cantor showed that ordinals are more basic than cardinals [Cantor, by Dummett]
Ordinals are generated by endless succession, followed by a limit ordinal [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
A cardinal is an abstraction, from the nature of a set's elements, and from their order [Cantor]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Cantor tried to prove points on a line matched naturals or reals - but nothing in between [Cantor, by Lavine]
Cantor's diagonal argument proved you can't list all decimal numbers between 0 and 1 [Cantor, by Read]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
A real is associated with an infinite set of infinite Cauchy sequences of rationals [Cantor, by Lavine]
Irrational numbers are the limits of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Irrationals and the Dedekind Cut implied infinite classes, but they seemed to have logical difficulties [Cantor, by Lavine]
It was Cantor's diagonal argument which revealed infinities greater than that of the real numbers [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Cantor proposes that there won't be a potential infinity if there is no actual infinity [Cantor, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
The naturals won't map onto the reals, so there are different sizes of infinity [Cantor, by George/Velleman]
Cantor needed Power Set for the reals, but then couldn't count the new collections [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
CH: An infinite set of reals corresponds 1-1 either to the naturals or to the reals [Cantor, by Koellner]
Cantor: there is no size between naturals and reals, or between a set and its power set [Cantor, by Hart,WD]
Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis says there is a gap between the natural and the real numbers [Cantor, by Horsten]
Continuum Hypothesis: there are no sets between N and P(N) [Cantor, by Wolf,RS]
Continuum Hypothesis: no cardinal greater than aleph-null but less than cardinality of the continuum [Cantor, by Chihara]
The Continuum Hypothesis says there are no sets between the natural numbers and reals [Cantor, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
Cantor's theory concerns collections which can be counted, using the ordinals [Cantor, by Lavine]
Cantor extended ordinals into the transfinite, and they can thus measure infinite cardinalities [Cantor, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
Cardinality strictly concerns one-one correspondence, to test infinite sameness of size [Cantor, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
The 'extension of a concept' in general may be quantitatively completely indeterminate [Cantor]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Property extensions outstrip objects, so shortage of objects caused the Caesar problem [Cantor, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Pure mathematics is pure set theory [Cantor]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Cantor says that maths originates only by abstraction from objects [Cantor, by Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic [Rey]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds [Rey]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience [Rey]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge [Rey]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
Animal learning is separate from their behaviour [Rey]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned [Rey]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex? [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentional explanations are always circular [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia [Rey]
Why qualia, and why this particular quale? [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey]
Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion [Rey]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality [Rey]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives [Rey]
Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious [Rey]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will' [Rey]
Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group [Rey]
Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment [Rey]
How are stimuli and responses 'similar'? [Rey]
Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey]
Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? [Rey]
Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
One computer program could either play chess or fight a war [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it [Rey]
Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism [Rey]
Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation' [Rey]
Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well [Rey]
Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes [Rey]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience? [Rey]
Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance [Rey]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli [Rey]
Children speak 90% good grammar [Rey]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Animals may also use a language of thought [Rey]
We train children in truth, not in grammar [Rey]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
Images can't replace computation, as they need it [Rey]
CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason [Rey]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images [Rey]
Animals map things over time as well as over space [Rey]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Infinities expand the bounds of the conceivable; we explore concepts to explore conceivability [Cantor, by Friend]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one [Rey]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Cantor says (vaguely) that we abstract numbers from equal sized sets [Hart,WD on Cantor]
We form the image of a cardinal number by a double abstraction, from the elements and from their order [Cantor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be [Rey]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal" [Rey]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts [Rey]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena [Rey]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey]
If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta') [Rey]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity [Rey]
Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed [Rey]
Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable [Rey]
The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used [Rey]
An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical) [Rey]
Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity [Rey]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then' [Rey]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Our desires become important when we have desires about desires [Rey]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Cantor proved that three dimensions have the same number of points as one dimension [Cantor, by Clegg]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Only God is absolutely infinite [Cantor, by Hart,WD]