Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Ian McFetridge and G.E.M. Anscombe

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24 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18487 We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18488 We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
7439 The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
8353 Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
8352 To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20041 Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
8070 It would be better to point to failings of character, than to moral wrongness of actions [Anscombe]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
8065 'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned [Anscombe]
8069 Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8351 With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
4777 The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10363 Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8350 Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe]