35 ideas
6346 | The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz] |
6351 | Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz] |
6374 | To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz] |
6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
6357 | Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
6363 | Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz] |
6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
6364 | We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz] |
6352 | Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz] |
6372 | Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
6360 | Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz] |
5901 | Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham] |
5934 | Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham] |
5271 | Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham] |
3777 | Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham] |
3554 | Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham] |
3781 | The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham] |
20977 | Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham] |
3778 | The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham] |
21003 | Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham] |
20280 | Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham] |
3779 | Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham] |
3780 | We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham] |