14 ideas
| 19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 1470 | Belief in an afterlife may be unverifiable in this life, but it will be verifiable after death [Hick, by PG] |
| 1471 | It may be hard to verify that we have become immortal, but we could still then verify religious claims [Hick, by PG] |
| 1469 | Some things (e.g. a section of the expansion of PI) can be verified but not falsified [Hick, by PG] |