68 ideas
| 18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
| 14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
| 14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
| 14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
| 14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
| 14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
| 14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
| 14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
| 14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
| 14742 | It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N] |
| 18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
| 14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
| 14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
| 14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| 14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
| 14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
| 14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| 14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| 14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
| 14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
| 14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
| 14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| 14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
| 14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
| 14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| 14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
| 18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
| 18885 | Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N] |
| 20489 | Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J] |
| 20532 | Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J] |
| 20483 | Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J] |
| 20490 | For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J] |
| 20493 | Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J] |
| 20494 | Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J] |
| 20500 | We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J] |
| 20497 | How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J] |
| 20506 | 'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J] |
| 20530 | Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J] |
| 20487 | A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J] |
| 20488 | It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J] |
| 20529 | Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J] |
| 20510 | A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J] |
| 20511 | Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J] |
| 20502 | Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J] |
| 20496 | A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J] |
| 20498 | We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J] |
| 20499 | Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J] |
| 20509 | Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J] |
| 20524 | Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J] |
| 20518 | Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J] |
| 20531 | Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J] |
| 20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
| 20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
| 20503 | Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J] |
| 20512 | Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J] |
| 20513 | If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J] |
| 20514 | If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J] |
| 20522 | Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J] |
| 20534 | Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J] |
| 20492 | Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J] |
| 18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |