20 ideas
8525 | Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K] |
8518 | Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K] |
8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
10197 | An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW] |
8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
8515 | Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K] |
8519 | Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K] |
4033 | Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K] |
10198 | If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW] |
10199 | Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
8512 | Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K] |
8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |
8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |
14610 | Neither 'moving spotlight' nor 'growing block' views explain why we care what is present or past [Zimmerman,DW] |
14608 | A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW] |