Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Lars Svendsen and Alex Oliver

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Modern Western culture suddenly appeared in Jena in the 1790s [Svendsen]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
You can't understand love in terms of 'if and only if...' [Svendsen]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver]
Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver]
If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver]
There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver]
Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver]
The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver]
The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver]
Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver]
Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver]
Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver]
Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
If subjective and objective begin to merge, then so do primary and secondary qualities [Svendsen]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Emotions have intentional objects, while a mood is objectless [Svendsen]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Death appears to be more frightening the less one has lived [Svendsen]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is so radical that suicide could not overcome it; only never having existed would do it [Svendsen]
We are bored because everything comes to us fully encoded, and we want personal meaning [Svendsen]
The profoundest boredom is boredom with boredom [Svendsen]
We can be unaware that we are bored [Svendsen]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
We have achieved a sort of utopia, and it is boring, so that is the end of utopias [Svendsen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The concept of 'alienation' seems no longer applicable [Svendsen]