37 ideas
| 8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| 10775 | The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp] |
| 10766 | Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp] |
| 10767 | Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp] |
| 10769 | Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp] |
| 10762 | In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp] |
| 10776 | The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp] |
| 10774 | There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp] |
| 10777 | Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp] |
| 10773 | The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp] |
| 10765 | Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp] |
| 10763 | Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp] |
| 10770 | If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp] |
| 10771 | Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp] |
| 10772 | Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp] |
| 10764 | A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp] |
| 10768 | Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp] |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| 8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| 8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| 8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
| 8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
| 8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
| 8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
| 8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
| 8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |