Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Michael Devitt and Peter Alexander

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22 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
8502 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8501 Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
15959 If the substantial form of brass implies its stability, how can it melt and remain brass? [Alexander,P]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
15956 The peripatetics treated forms and real qualities as independent of matter, and non-material [Alexander,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9354 Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
19565 How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9353 We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9356 The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
19564 Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
15975 Can the qualities of a body be split into two groups, where the smaller explains the larger? [Alexander,P]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
15963 Science has been partly motivated by the belief that the universe is run by God's laws [Alexander,P]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
15951 Alchemists tried to separate out essences, which influenced later chemistry [Alexander,P]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
15981 Absolute space either provides locations, or exists but lacks 'marks' for locations [Alexander,P]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17369 We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
17367 Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]