13 ideas
| 22353 | One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22356 | An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22359 | Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22360 | The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22362 | Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22364 | Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 16186 | The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen] |
| 16187 | The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen] |
| 16190 | BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen] |
| 16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |
| 22357 | The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 22365 | The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |