44 ideas
16241 | The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin] |
16257 | Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin] |
16276 | Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin] |
16244 | If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin] |
16255 | The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin] |
17292 | Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P] |
17295 | Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P] |
17297 | A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P] |
17302 | Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P] |
17303 | The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P] |
17294 | Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P] |
17300 | If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P] |
17296 | We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P] |
17301 | Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P] |
16243 | The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin] |
16271 | Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin] |
16273 | If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin] |
16275 | The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin] |
17293 | Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P] |
16258 | To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin] |
16259 | Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin] |
16253 | A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin] |
16263 | Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin] |
16260 | Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin] |
16277 | Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin] |
16249 | A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin] |
16254 | Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin] |
17298 | Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P] |
16245 | Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin] |
17299 | There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
16248 | Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin] |
16250 | We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin] |
16268 | The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin] |
16267 | If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin] |
16269 | If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin] |
16247 | Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin] |
16272 | Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin] |
16242 | Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin] |
16251 | 'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin] |
16270 | If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin] |
16264 | I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin] |
16265 | If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin] |
16266 | There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin] |