64 ideas
10468 | A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver] |
23966 | The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie] |
10471 | Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver] |
10749 | Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
10750 | Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver] |
10747 | Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver] |
10748 | Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver] |
10719 | There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver] |
10721 | If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver] |
10716 | There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver] |
10720 | We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver] |
10714 | The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver] |
10715 | There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver] |
10741 | Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver] |
10739 | The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver] |
10740 | The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver] |
10738 | Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver] |
10742 | Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver] |
10472 | 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver] |
10724 | Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver] |
10730 | If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver] |
7963 | Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver] |
7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver] |
10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver] |
10722 | Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver] |
10744 | Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver] |
10726 | Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver] |
10725 | Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver] |
10745 | Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
24005 | We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie] |
24006 | Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie] |
23978 | 'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie] |
23973 | Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie] |
23974 | Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie] |
23972 | A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie] |
23992 | Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie] |
23979 | Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie] |
23976 | If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie] |
23977 | When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie] |
23980 | It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie] |
23982 | If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie] |
23968 | If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie] |
23969 | We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie] |
23984 | An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie] |
24001 | Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie] |
23986 | Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie] |
23970 | Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie] |
23985 | A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie] |
23991 | Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie] |
23967 | Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie] |
23971 | Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie] |
23975 | Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie] |
23983 | We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie] |
23999 | Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie] |
23994 | Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie] |
23998 | Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie] |
10746 | Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver] |
23995 | Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie] |
24000 | Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie] |
24003 | Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie] |
24002 | We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie] |
24004 | Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie] |
23993 | Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie] |