145 ideas
22396 | We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot] |
22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
22397 | Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot] |
15357 | Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten] |
15352 | A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten] |
10882 | Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten] |
15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
15374 | Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten] |
22462 | We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot] |
15348 | Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten] |
15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
15337 | The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten] |
15334 | The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten] |
15336 | The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten] |
15354 | Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten] |
15340 | Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten] |
15345 | Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten] |
15373 | Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten] |
15346 | Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten] |
15371 | An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten] |
15332 | 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten] |
15361 | A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten] |
15350 | The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten] |
15351 | Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten] |
15367 | By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten] |
15330 | Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15331 | Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten] |
15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
15329 | Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten] |
15326 | Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten] |
15341 | Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten] |
15328 | A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten] |
15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |
15366 | Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten] |
10884 | A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten] |
15353 | The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten] |
15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
15364 | English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten] |
10885 | Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten] |
10881 | The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten] |
15360 | ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten] |
15369 | Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten] |
15370 | Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten] |
15338 | We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten] |
15363 | In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten] |
15362 | If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten] |
15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |
22449 | When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
22371 | Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot] |
23438 | Full rationality must include morality [Foot] |
15347 | A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten] |
23437 | Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot] |
22480 | Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot] |
23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
22372 | Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot] |
22393 | I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot] |
23436 | It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot] |
22481 | There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG] |
22482 | I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot] |
22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |
22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
4692 | It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot] |
4694 | Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot] |
22445 | Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot] |
22444 | A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot] |
23683 | Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
22451 | All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot] |
22485 | Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot] |
22474 | Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot] |
23684 | Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23690 | We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
23431 | Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot] |
23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
22477 | Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot] |
22486 | The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot] |
23432 | Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot] |
22375 | Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot] |
22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
23433 | Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot] |
22378 | We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot] |
22487 | Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot] |
22377 | Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot] |
22376 | Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot] |
22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
23434 | There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot] |
22447 | Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot] |
22452 | Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot] |
23439 | Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot] |
23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |
22381 | Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot] |
22379 | The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot] |
22458 | Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot] |
22460 | Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot] |
22461 | Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot] |
22464 | The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot] |
22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
22402 | Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot] |
23145 | Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver] |
22401 | Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot] |
22398 | Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot] |
22478 | The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot] |
23692 | Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot] |
22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
22373 | People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot] |
22456 | Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot] |
22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |
22403 | Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot] |
22472 | The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot] |
22479 | Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot] |
22400 | Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot] |
22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |
22395 | Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot] |
22448 | We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot] |
22463 | Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot] |
22459 | For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot] |
22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |
4693 | The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot] |
22383 | Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot] |
22446 | In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot] |
22380 | Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot] |