Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Richard L. Kirkham and D.H. Mellor

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16 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor]
Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley]