Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Robert C. Stalnaker and Simone Weil

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176 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Among the Greeks Aristotle is the only philosopher in the modern style [Weil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
All thought about values is philosophical, and thought about anything else is not philosophy [Weil]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to change the soul, not to accumulate knowledge [Weil]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Systems are not unique to each philosopher. The platonist tradition is old and continuous [Weil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is a value of thought [Weil]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Genius and love of truth are always accompanied by great humility [Weil]
Most people won't question an idea's truth if they depend on it [Weil]
We seek truth only because it is good [Weil]
Truth is not a object we love - it is the radiant manifestation of reality [Weil]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker]
A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Creation produced a network or web of determinations [Weil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker]
'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Chance is compatible with necessity, and the two occur together [Weil]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker]
We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan]
Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Knowledge is beyond question, as an unavoidable component of thinking [Weil]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
What is sacred is not a person, but the whole physical human being [Weil]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The mind is imprisoned and limited by language, restricting our awareness of wider thoughts [Weil]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The secret of art is that beauty is a just blend of unity and its opposite [Weil]
We both desire what is beautiful, and want it to remain as it is [Weil]
The aesthete's treatment of beauty as amusement is sacreligious; beauty should nourish [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
Beauty is an attractive mystery, leaving nothing to be desired [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
Art (like philosophy) establishes a relation between world and self, and between oneself and others [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
When we admire a work, we see ourselves as its creator [Weil]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Those who say immorality is not an aesthetic criterion must show that all criteria are aesthetic [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil]
Beauty, goodness and truth are only achieved by applying full attention [Weil]
Beauty is the proof of what is good [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
In a violent moral disagreement, it can't be that both sides are just following social morality [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
Ends, unlike means, cannot be defined, which is why people tend to pursue means [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
All we need are the unity of justice, truth and beauty [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
The sacred in every human is their expectation of good rather than evil [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Everything which originates in love is beautiful [Weil]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil is transmitted by comforts and pleasures, but mostly by doing harm to people [Weil]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
There are two goods - the absolute good we want, and the reachable opposite of evil [Weil]
The good is a nothingness, and yet real [Weil]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Morality would improve if people could pursue private interests [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil]
The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil]
We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil]
We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Respect is our only obligation, which can only be expressed through deeds, not words [Weil]
We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Friendship is partly universal - the love of a person is like the ideal of loving everyone [Weil]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
The most important human need is to have multiple roots [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The need for order stands above all others, and is understood via the other needs [Weil]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Obligations only bind individuals, not collectives [Weil]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
A citizen should be able to understand the whole of society [Weil]
We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil]
Even the poorest should feel collective ownership, and participation in grand display [Weil]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
Culture is an instrument for creating an ongoing succession of teachers [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
People in power always try to increase their power [Weil]
In oppressive societies the scope of actual control is extended by a religion of power [Weil]
Force is what turns man into a thing, and ultimately into a corpse [Weil]
The essence of power is illusory prestige [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
A lifelong head of society should only be a symbol, not a ruler [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / a. Centralisation
No central authority can initiate decentralisation [Weil]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Spontaneous movements are powerless against organised repression [Weil]
After a bloody revolution the group which already had the power comes to the fore [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
A group is only dangerous if it endorses an abstract entity [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Decentralisation is only possible by co-operation between strong and weak - which is absurd [Weil]
Our only social duty is to try to limit evil [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
National leaders want to preserve necessary order - but always the existing order [Weil]
We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Party politics in a democracy can't avoid an anti-democratic party [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
True democracy is the subordination of society to the individual [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Only individual people of good will can achieve social progress [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
In the least evil societies people can think, control community life, and be autonomous [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
Socialism tends to make a proletariat of the whole population [Weil]
It is not more money which the wretched members of society need [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The collective is the one and only object of false idolatry [Weil]
The problem of the collective is not suppression of persons, but persons erasing themselves [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Marx showed that capitalist oppression, because of competition, is unstoppable [Weil]
Once money is the main aim, society needs everyone to think wealth is possible [Weil]
The capitalists neglect the people and the nation, and even their own interests [Weil]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
National prestige consists of behaving as if you could beat the others in a war [Weil]
Charity is the only love, and you can feel that for a country (a place with traditions), but not a nation [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If effort is from necessity rather than for a good, it is slavery [Weil]
The pleasure of completing tasks motivates just as well as the whip of slavery [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Relationships depend on equality, so unequal treatment kills them [Weil]
People absurdly claim an equal share of things which are essentially privileged [Weil]
By making money the sole human measure, inequality has become universal [Weil]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequality could easily be mitigated, if it were not for the struggle for power [Weil]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
People have duties, and only have rights because of the obligations of others to them [Weil]
Rights are asserted contentiously, and need the backing of force [Weil]
Giving centrality to rights stifles all impulses of charity [Weil]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Only people who understand force, and don't respect it, are capable of justice [Weil]
The spirit of justice needs the full attention of truth, and that attention is love [Weil]
Justice (concerning harm) is distinct from rights (concerning inequality) [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
To punish people we must ourselves be innocent - but that undermines the desire to punish [Weil]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
The only thing in society worse than crime is repressive justice [Weil]
Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil]
Punishment aims at the good for men who don't desire it [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Modern wars are fought in the name of empty words which are given capital letters [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
When war was a profession, customary morality justified any act of war [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
The soldier-civilian distinction should be abolished; every citizen is committed to a war [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
War is perpetuated by its continual preparations [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Education is essentially motivation [Weil]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Dividing history books into separate chapters is disastrous [Weil]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Even if a drowning man is doomed, he should keep swimming to the last [Weil]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil]
The only choice is between supernatural good, or evil [Weil]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The only legitimate proof of God by order derives from beauty [Weil]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 5. Bible
The cruelty of the Old Testament put me off Christianity [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion should quietly suffuse all human life with its light [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
I attach little importance to immortality, which is an undecidable fact, and irrelevant to us [Weil]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The soul is the intrinsic value of a human [Weil]