28 ideas
7786 | Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle] |
7798 | There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle] |
7799 | Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle] |
7797 | Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle] |
7794 | There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle] |
7793 | ◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle] |
7795 | S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle] |
7787 | Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle] |
7788 | Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle] |
7796 | Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle] |
7789 | Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle] |
7790 | If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle] |
7800 | Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle] |
7801 | Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle] |
7792 | A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle] |
23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |