120 ideas
23657 | The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid] |
23655 | An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid] |
23634 | Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid] |
14562 | A process is unified as an expression of a collection of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14541 | Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs [Mumford/Anjum] |
14553 | Weak emergence is just unexpected, and strong emergence is beyond all deduction [Mumford/Anjum] |
14538 | Powers explain properties, causes, modality, events, and perhaps even particulars [Mumford/Anjum] |
23664 | Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid] |
23669 | Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid] |
14555 | Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do [Mumford/Anjum] |
23666 | It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid] |
14557 | Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14583 | Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum] |
14536 | We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable [Mumford/Anjum] |
14584 | The simple conditional analysis of dispositions doesn't allow for possible prevention [Mumford/Anjum] |
14582 | Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality? [Mumford/Anjum] |
23651 | Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid] |
23650 | Only individuals exist [Reid] |
23649 | No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid] |
14542 | If statue and clay fall and crush someone, the event is not overdetermined [Mumford/Anjum] |
14535 | Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
1350 | Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid] |
14561 | Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent [Mumford/Anjum] |
21322 | We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid] |
21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
11874 | Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid] |
17535 | Dispositionality has its own distinctive type of modality [Mumford/Anjum] |
14579 | Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases [Mumford/Anjum] |
14580 | Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been [Mumford/Anjum] |
14552 | Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world [Mumford/Anjum] |
14578 | Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds [Mumford/Anjum] |
14549 | Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers [Mumford/Anjum] |
11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
23659 | If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid] |
23662 | The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid] |
23661 | We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid] |
23635 | Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid] |
7631 | Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid] |
14585 | We have more than five senses; balance and proprioception, for example [Mumford/Anjum] |
23637 | Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid] |
23638 | Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid] |
23639 | It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid] |
6492 | Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H] |
23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
23654 | In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid] |
23644 | Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid] |
23643 | We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid] |
23660 | The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid] |
23641 | People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid] |
23642 | If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid] |
23549 | We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M] |
14576 | Smoking disposes towards cancer; smokers without cancer do not falsify this claim [Mumford/Anjum] |
14551 | If causation were necessary, the past would fix the future, and induction would be simple [Mumford/Anjum] |
14571 | The only full uniformities in nature occur from the essences of fundamental things [Mumford/Anjum] |
14570 | Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects [Mumford/Anjum] |
14569 | It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation [Mumford/Anjum] |
14568 | A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure [Mumford/Anjum] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
1356 | A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid] |
23658 | Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid] |
23665 | Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid] |
1359 | Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid] |
21319 | I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid] |
21323 | The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid] |
21321 | Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid] |
21324 | If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid] |
21325 | Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid] |
21327 | If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid] |
1366 | If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid] |
1352 | Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid] |
23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
23668 | Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid] |
23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
14556 | Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness [Mumford/Anjum] |
23652 | We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid] |
23656 | The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid] |
23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
23648 | First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid] |
23653 | If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid] |
23640 | Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid] |
23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
23663 | There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid] |
23674 | If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid] |
23675 | We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid] |
23672 | To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid] |
23673 | Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid] |
23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |
14566 | Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices [Mumford/Anjum] |
14577 | Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14563 | Causation is the passing around of powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14587 | We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced [Mumford/Anjum] |
14533 | Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process [Mumford/Anjum] |
14558 | A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones [Mumford/Anjum] |
14559 | Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14565 | Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another [Mumford/Anjum] |
14567 | Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum] |
8383 | Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane] |
23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
14537 | Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse [Mumford/Anjum] |
14573 | Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false [Mumford/Anjum] |
14572 | Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14574 | Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation [Mumford/Anjum] |
23667 | Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid] |
14539 | Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects [Mumford/Anjum] |
14550 | We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects [Mumford/Anjum] |
14546 | Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that [Mumford/Anjum] |
23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |
23670 | Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid] |
23671 | Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid] |
14575 | A 'ceteris paribus' clause implies that a conditional only has dispositional force [Mumford/Anjum] |
14548 | There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it [Mumford/Anjum] |
14554 | Laws are nothing more than descriptions of the behaviour of powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
14564 | If laws are equations, cause and effect must be simultaneous (or the law would be falsified)! [Mumford/Anjum] |