Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Samir Okasha and Carrie Jenkins

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
17729 Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
17740 Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
17730 Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17719 Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins]
17717 Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
17724 It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17727 We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
22180 Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17720 There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
17728 The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
17726 Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
17734 It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
17723 Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
22177 Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha]
22172 Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22174 The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha]
22175 Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
22182 Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
22185 Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
22176 Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
22178 If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
20653 Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
17739 The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins]
17718 Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
17731 Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
17732 Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
17725 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / b. Laws of motion
22173 Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17366 Virtually all modern views of speciation rest on relational rather than intrinsic features [Okasha]