158 ideas
| 22115 | Wise people should contemplate and discuss the truth, and fight against falsehood [Aquinas] |
| 22101 | Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are [Aquinas] |
| 1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
| 1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
| 21267 | Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas] |
| 22102 | Arguing with opponents uncovers truths, and restrains falsehoods [Aquinas] |
| 13070 | If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 11197 | The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things [Aquinas] |
| 23176 | Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas] |
| 20621 | Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
| 1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
| 21248 | If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas] |
| 15186 | In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin] |
| 22104 | Truth is the conformity of being to intellect [Aquinas] |
| 23173 | If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow [Aquinas] |
| 22919 | A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin] |
| 11195 | If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent [Aquinas] |
| 22103 | Being is basic to thought, and all other concepts are additions to being [Aquinas] |
| 15812 | Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas] |
| 21268 | Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas] |
| 16655 | Different genera are delimited by modes of predication, which rest on modes of being [Aquinas] |
| 16641 | Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas] |
| 11201 | Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas] |
| 11205 | If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato [Aquinas] |
| 13090 | The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Aquinas, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| 17555 | 'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas] |
| 16765 | Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas] |
| 16766 | One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them [Aquinas] |
| 11202 | It is by having essence that things exist [Aquinas] |
| 11203 | Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas] |
| 11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
| 11196 | Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories [Aquinas] |
| 11208 | A simple substance is its own essence [Aquinas] |
| 22170 | Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things [Aquinas] |
| 23175 | The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas] |
| 21337 | A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas] |
| 21249 | Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas] |
| 22169 | Initial universal truths are present within us as potential, to be drawn out by reason [Aquinas] |
| 21250 | A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas] |
| 22168 | Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas] |
| 20224 | Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas] |
| 1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
| 22109 | The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 15207 | We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories [Le Poidevin] |
| 22926 | In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin] |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| 11198 | Definition of essence makes things understandable [Aquinas] |
| 22107 | Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 9098 | Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas] |
| 9092 | Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas] |
| 9093 | We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas] |
| 9097 | The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas] |
| 9095 | Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas] |
| 9099 | Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas] |
| 10508 | Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas] |
| 22111 | Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
| 1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
| 1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
| 1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
| 1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
| 1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
| 1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
| 22105 | The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas] |
| 20700 | Without God's influence every operation would stop, so God causes everything [Aquinas] |
| 22108 | First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas] |
| 10503 | We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things [Aquinas] |
| 10509 | Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species [Aquinas] |
| 10506 | Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter [Aquinas] |
| 9094 | Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance [Aquinas] |
| 10505 | We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature [Aquinas] |
| 10504 | Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas] |
| 10507 | Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities [Aquinas] |
| 9096 | The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas] |
| 11206 | The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world [Aquinas] |
| 22932 | We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin] |
| 1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
| 1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
| 1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
| 23180 | The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas] |
| 1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
| 22112 | For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason [Aquinas] |
| 22494 | We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it [Aquinas] |
| 6866 | It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin] |
| 15190 | Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin] |
| 1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
| 23181 | All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good [Aquinas] |
| 8009 | Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre] |
| 23182 | Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas] |
| 22399 | Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason [Aquinas] |
| 23177 | Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas] |
| 6867 | Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin] |
| 23179 | People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas] |
| 23174 | Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law [Aquinas] |
| 22113 | Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas] |
| 22114 | Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas] |
| 7291 | For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling] |
| 5508 | Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 16687 | Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas] |
| 22927 | The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin] |
| 11207 | A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause [Aquinas] |
| 1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
| 22922 | We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin] |
| 22924 | If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin] |
| 22923 | Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin] |
| 22928 | For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin] |
| 22931 | We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin] |
| 22917 | Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin] |
| 22921 | Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin] |
| 15202 | Eternity coexists with passing time, as the centre of a circle coexists with its circumference [Aquinas] |
| 15195 | If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin] |
| 15188 | If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin] |
| 22934 | Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin] |
| 15191 | At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin] |
| 15197 | Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin] |
| 15206 | It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time [Le Poidevin] |
| 15198 | In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin] |
| 15189 | Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin] |
| 6865 | A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin] |
| 15187 | It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin] |
| 15205 | Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed [Le Poidevin] |
| 15192 | We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin] |
| 15193 | The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin] |
| 22938 | To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin] |
| 22939 | The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin] |
| 22940 | If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin] |
| 22953 | Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin] |
| 22947 | An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin] |
| 22952 | If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin] |
| 22951 | If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin] |
| 22948 | There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin] |
| 22949 | Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin] |
| 22950 | If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin] |
| 22943 | Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin] |
| 22945 | The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin] |
| 22937 | If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin] |
| 22925 | The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin] |
| 22944 | The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin] |
| 22942 | If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin] |
| 22946 | The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin] |
| 15196 | God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin] |
| 22941 | How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin] |
| 23178 | Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas] |
| 21251 | We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas] |
| 5614 | If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas] |
| 21269 | Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas] |
| 21270 | Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas] |
| 21271 | Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas] |
| 21272 | Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas] |
| 21273 | Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas] |
| 20211 | Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Aquinas, by Zagzebski] |
| 22106 | Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 16711 | Heretics should be eradicated like wolves [Aquinas] |
| 23306 | Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji] |
| 1863 | If the soul achieves well-being in another life, it doesn't follow that I do [Aquinas] |
| 4412 | Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished [Aquinas] |
| 21266 | God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas] |
| 21274 | It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas] |