89 ideas
15186 | In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin] |
22919 | A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin] |
5937 | The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross] |
5936 | Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross] |
5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
15207 | We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories [Le Poidevin] |
5940 | Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross] |
22926 | In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
5924 | Identical objects must have identical value [Ross] |
22932 | We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin] |
5933 | Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross] |
5928 | Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross] |
5911 | Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross] |
5926 | The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross] |
7259 | Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J] |
5913 | The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross] |
5920 | Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross] |
5923 | The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross] |
5918 | The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross] |
5930 | All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross] |
5922 | An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross] |
6866 | It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin] |
15190 | Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin] |
5921 | We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross] |
5932 | The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross] |
5910 | The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross] |
5898 | 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross] |
5899 | If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross] |
5904 | In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross] |
5919 | Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross] |
5941 | Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross] |
5938 | Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross] |
5931 | All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross] |
5939 | Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross] |
5905 | We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross] |
5929 | No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross] |
5906 | Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross] |
18622 | Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross] |
5908 | Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross] |
5917 | People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross] |
5900 | We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross] |
5942 | We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross] |
5909 | Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG] |
5914 | An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross] |
5912 | We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross] |
6867 | Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin] |
5916 | Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross] |
5915 | Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross] |
22927 | The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin] |
22922 | We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin] |
22924 | If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin] |
22923 | Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin] |
22928 | For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin] |
22931 | We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin] |
22917 | Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin] |
22921 | Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin] |
15195 | If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin] |
15188 | If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin] |
22934 | Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin] |
15191 | At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin] |
15197 | Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin] |
15206 | It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time [Le Poidevin] |
15198 | In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin] |
15189 | Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin] |
6865 | A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin] |
15187 | It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin] |
15205 | Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed [Le Poidevin] |
15192 | We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin] |
15193 | The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin] |
22938 | To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin] |
22939 | The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin] |
22940 | If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin] |
22953 | Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin] |
22947 | An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin] |
22952 | If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin] |
22951 | If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin] |
22948 | There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin] |
22949 | Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin] |
22950 | If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin] |
22943 | Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin] |
22945 | The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin] |
22937 | If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin] |
22925 | The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin] |
22944 | The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin] |
22942 | If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin] |
22946 | The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin] |
15196 | God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin] |
22941 | How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin] |