86 ideas
15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan] |
15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan] |
5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan] |
6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
5500 | Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan] |
6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan] |
5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan] |
15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan] |
15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan] |
15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
5729 | If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius] |
5702 | The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius] |
5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
5727 | Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius] |
5714 | Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
5718 | The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius] |
5717 | The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius] |
21387 | The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius] |
6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
5709 | The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius] |
5695 | Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius] |
5711 | The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius] |
5712 | Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius] |
6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan] |
6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
5499 | A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan] |
5719 | The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius] |
5724 | Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius] |
6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
5713 | You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius] |
6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan] |
7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan] |
7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan] |
7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan] |
7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan] |
7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan] |
7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan] |
6611 | One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius] |
5730 | Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius] |
5726 | The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius] |
5705 | Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius] |
5716 | Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius] |
6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
5501 | People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan] |
5704 | There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius] |
5703 | The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius] |
5693 | Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius] |
5701 | If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius] |
5708 | In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius] |
17004 | Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius] |
5696 | If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius] |
5706 | Atoms move themselves [Lucretius] |
5700 | It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius] |
6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |
5698 | We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius] |
5715 | This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius] |
5694 | Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius] |
5699 | If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius] |
5707 | The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius] |
5710 | Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius] |
5731 | Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius] |
5722 | For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius] |
5725 | An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius] |
5720 | Spirit is mortal [Lucretius] |
5721 | The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius] |
5723 | If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius] |