Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E, Theophrastus and Michael Frede

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

22 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / e. Late classical philosophy
23326 In the third century Stoicism died out, replaced by Platonism, with Aristotelian ethics [Frede,M]
23335 In late antiquity nearly all philosophers were monotheists [Frede,M]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / b. Early medieval philosophy
16137 Earlier views of Aristotle were dominated by 'Categories' [Frede,M]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
23249 The early philosophers thought that reason has its own needs and desires [Frede,M]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19125 If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19128 If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
19120 Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19127 The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19124 A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
19126 If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
19129 The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
19130 KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
19121 We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
19122 Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
16157 Insurance on the original ship would hardly be paid out if the plank version was wrecked! [Frede,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
20921 How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
23334 For Christians man has free will by creation in God's image (as in Genesis) [Frede,M]
23337 The Stoics needed free will, to allow human choices in a divinely providential cosmos [Frede,M]
23333 The idea of free will achieved universal acceptance because of Christianity [Frede,M]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
23336 There is no will for Plato or Aristotle, because actions come directly from perception of what is good [Frede,M]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
5990 Theophrastus doubted whether nature could be explained teleologically [Theophrastus, by Gottschalk]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
23313 The Gnostic demiurge (creator) is deluded, and doesn't care about us [Frede,M]