31 ideas
18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
18088 | Intentionality is the mark of dispositions, not of the mental [Place] |
18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |
18089 | Dispositions are not general laws, but laws of the natures of individual entities [Place] |