113 ideas
3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
19304 | The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman] |
19307 | If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman] |
19309 | Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman] |
6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
19306 | It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman] |
3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
19303 | Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman] |
12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh] |
21032 | Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel] |
21033 | Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel] |
19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh] |
19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh] |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |
19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh] |
19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh] |
19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh] |
19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh] |
12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |
19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |
19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |
3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
8800 | If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa] |
6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
17060 | Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Harman, by Smart] |
12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |
3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |
3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
5122 | Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman] |
5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |
21038 | Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel] |
21039 | Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel] |
21036 | Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel] |
21030 | The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel] |
5123 | Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman] |
5124 | If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman] |
5125 | Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman] |
22262 | Kant's moral law has no foundation - because that would undermine its priority [Sandel] |
21031 | Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel] |
20594 | Choosers in the 'original position' have been stripped of most human characteristics [Sandel, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
21035 | Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel] |
21037 | A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel] |
21034 | A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel] |
22258 | Passion for progress is always short-lived [Sandel] |
22259 | Conservatives are either individualistic, or communal [Sandel] |
22264 | Modern liberal rights in democracies protect individuals against the majority [Sandel] |
22261 | Liberals say rights always come first, and justice is neutral on social values [Sandel] |
21120 | The self is 'unencumbered' if it can abandon its roles and commitments without losing identity [Sandel, by Shorten] |
22263 | Liberal justice means the withdrawal of the self, as transcendental or as unencumbered [Sandel] |
21049 | Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel] |
22805 | Liberalism concerns rights, and communitarianism concerns the common good [Sandel, by Avineri/De-Shalit] |
22260 | Modern liberalism fails to articulate a vision of the common good [Sandel] |
22265 | I can't defend the view that the majority values of a community are thereby right [Sandel] |
22268 | If persons define themselves by a group membership, insults to that group are a real harm [Sandel] |
22267 | In the liberal view an insult to my group doesn't hurt me, since I'm defined by choices not groups [Sandel] |
21040 | Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel] |
21028 | We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel] |
21027 | Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel] |
21042 | Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel] |
21043 | Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel] |
21052 | Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel] |
21048 | Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel] |
22266 | The case for religious liberty depends on the religion contributing to a morally good life [Sandel] |
21045 | Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel] |