Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hans Reichenbach, Karen Bennett and Scott Sturgeon

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18 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Contextual values are acceptable in research, but not in its final evaluation [Reichenbach, by Reiss/Sprenger]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K]
Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K]
Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K]
Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Kant showed that our perceptions are partly constructed from our concepts [Reichenbach]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon]
Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
A theory of causal relations yields an asymmetry which defines the direction of time [Reichenbach, by Salmon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
The direction of time is grounded in the direction of causation [Reichenbach, by Ladyman/Ross]