39 ideas
3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
22180 | Multiple realisability is said to make reduction impossible [Okasha] |
10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
22177 | Randomised Control Trials have a treatment and a control group, chosen at random [Okasha] |
22172 | Not all sciences are experimental; astronomy relies on careful observation [Okasha] |
22174 | The discoverers of Neptune didn't change their theory because of an anomaly [Okasha] |
22175 | Science mostly aims at confirming theories, rather than falsifying them [Okasha] |
22182 | Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha] |
22185 | Two things can't be incompatible if they are incommensurable [Okasha] |
22176 | Induction is inferences from examined to unexamined instances of a given kind [Okasha] |
22178 | If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional [Okasha] |
3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
22173 | Galileo refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier objects fall faster [Okasha] |
17366 | Virtually all modern views of speciation rest on relational rather than intrinsic features [Okasha] |