159 ideas
| 15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
| 15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
| 15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
| 15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
| 15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
| 15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| 15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
| 15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
| 15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
| 15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
| 15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
| 15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
| 15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
| 15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
| 15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
| 15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
| 15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
| 15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
| 15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
| 15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
| 15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
| 15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
| 15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
| 15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
| 15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
| 15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
| 15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
| 15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
| 15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
| 15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
| 15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
| 15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
| 15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
| 15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
| 15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
| 15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
| 15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
| 15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
| 15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
| 15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
| 15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
| 15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
| 15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
| 15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
| 15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
| 15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
| 15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
| 15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
| 15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
| 15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
| 15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
| 15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
| 15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
| 15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
| 15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
| 15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
| 7435 | Dispositions are second-order properties, the property of having some property [Jackson/Pargetter/Prior, by Armstrong] |
| 15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
| 15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
| 19956 | True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu] |
| 19962 | Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu] |
| 19961 | Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu] |
| 19963 | People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu] |
| 20008 | People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu] |
| 19993 | In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu] |
| 19992 | In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu] |
| 20005 | The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu] |
| 19995 | All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu] |
| 19964 | The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu] |
| 19972 | The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu] |
| 19974 | Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu] |
| 19976 | Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu] |
| 19978 | In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu] |
| 19985 | In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu] |
| 19986 | Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu] |
| 19988 | A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu] |
| 19975 | Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu] |
| 19977 | Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu] |
| 20007 | Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu] |
| 19989 | The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu] |
| 19970 | If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu] |
| 19971 | Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu] |
| 19984 | Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu] |
| 19980 | If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu] |
| 19996 | A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu] |
| 19997 | The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu] |
| 19965 | The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu] |
| 19968 | It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu] |
| 19969 | Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu] |
| 19999 | All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu] |
| 19967 | In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu] |
| 19966 | A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu] |
| 19998 | If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu] |
| 20000 | Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu] |
| 20003 | Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu] |
| 20006 | The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu] |
| 20009 | Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu] |
| 19994 | Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu] |
| 19981 | No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu] |
| 19991 | Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu] |
| 19990 | Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu] |
| 19982 | Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu] |
| 19983 | Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu] |
| 19959 | Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu] |
| 19960 | Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu] |
| 20002 | The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu] |
| 20010 | If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu] |
| 20001 | The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu] |
| 19973 | The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu] |
| 20011 | Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu] |
| 19987 | Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu] |
| 20004 | French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu] |
| 19979 | In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu] |
| 19957 | Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu] |
| 15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
| 15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
| 15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
| 15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
| 15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
| 15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
| 15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
| 15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
| 15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
| 15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
| 15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
| 19958 | Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu] |
| 15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
| 15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
| 15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
| 15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
| 15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
| 15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
| 15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
| 15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |