64 ideas
| 19090 | If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty] |
| 2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
| 2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
| 18486 | We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride] |
| 4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
| 18484 | Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride] |
| 18466 | If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride] |
| 18473 | 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride] |
| 18481 | Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride] |
| 18483 | The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride] |
| 18479 | There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride] |
| 18477 | There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride] |
| 18482 | Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride] |
| 18474 | Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride] |
| 18485 | Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride] |
| 18490 | Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride] |
| 18493 | Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride] |
| 2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
| 18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
| 18476 | 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride] |
| 8923 | Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function [MacBride] |
| 8926 | For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride] |
| 18480 | Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride] |
| 18471 | Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride] |
| 18472 | Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride] |
| 18475 | Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride] |
| 21354 | It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it [MacBride] |
| 21353 | Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters [MacBride] |
| 21352 | 'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata [MacBride] |
| 18478 | Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride] |
| 9240 | Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt] |
| 2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
| 6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
| 2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
| 2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
| 2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
| 2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
| 2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
| 2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
| 2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
| 2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
| 9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 9228 | Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt] |
| 9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
| 9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
| 9238 | Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt] |
| 9232 | It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt] |
| 9234 | If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt] |
| 9229 | What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt] |
| 9233 | Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt] |
| 9235 | Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt] |
| 9236 | Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt] |
| 9237 | The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt] |
| 9239 | I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt] |
| 9227 | We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt] |
| 9230 | People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt] |
| 9241 | Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt] |
| 9300 | Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt] |
| 2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
| 9231 | Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt] |