235 ideas
7623 | For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value [Putnam] |
2352 | The job of the philosopher is to distinguish facts about the world from conventions [Putnam] |
2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
6782 | Realism is the only philosophy of science that doesn't make the success of science a miracle [Putnam] |
6267 | A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science' [Putnam] |
6272 | 'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science [Putnam] |
6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
4714 | Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
6266 | We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam] |
7617 | Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth [Putnam] |
6277 | Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam] |
4716 | The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
8828 | Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam] |
7616 | Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam] |
18951 | For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory [Putnam] |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
2347 | Asserting the truth of an indexical statement is not the same as uttering the statement [Putnam] |
6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
18953 | Modern notation frees us from Aristotle's restriction of only using two class-names in premises [Putnam] |
18949 | The universal syllogism is now expressed as the transitivity of subclasses [Putnam] |
18952 | '⊃' ('if...then') is used with the definition 'Px ⊃ Qx' is short for '¬(Px & ¬Qx)' [Putnam] |
18958 | In type theory, 'x ∈ y' is well defined only if x and y are of the appropriate type [Putnam] |
9944 | We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam] |
13655 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro] |
9915 | V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam] |
18954 | Before the late 19th century logic was trivialised by not dealing with relations [Putnam] |
18956 | Asserting first-order validity implicitly involves second-order reference to classes [Putnam] |
18962 | Unfashionably, I think logic has an empirical foundation [Putnam] |
10066 | Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Putnam, by Musgrave] |
6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
18961 | We can identify functions with certain sets - or identify sets with certain functions [Putnam] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
18955 | Having a valid form doesn't ensure truth, as it may be meaningless [Putnam] |
14203 | Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same [Putnam] |
14207 | If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth [Putnam] |
9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
18959 | Sets larger than the continuum should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
18200 | Very large sets should be studied in an 'if-then' spirit [Putnam] |
9937 | I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam] |
9939 | It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam] |
3663 | How can you contemplate Platonic entities without causal transactions with them? [Putnam] |
9940 | Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam] |
9914 | It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam] |
9941 | Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam] |
18199 | Indispensability strongly supports predicative sets, and somewhat supports impredicative sets [Putnam] |
8857 | We must quantify over numbers for science; but that commits us to their existence [Putnam] |
6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
6280 | Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language [Putnam] |
17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
9943 | You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam] |
22181 | Putnam says anti-realism is a bad explanation of accurate predictions [Putnam, by Okasha] |
14214 | If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Putnam, by Lewis] |
17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
14205 | The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree [Putnam] |
7610 | A fact is simply what it is rational to accept [Putnam] |
6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
7618 | Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam] |
18957 | Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam] |
2351 | Aristotle says an object (e.g. a lamp) has identity if its parts stay together when it is moved [Putnam] |
18950 | Physics is full of non-physical entities, such as space-vectors [Putnam] |
17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
18890 | Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam] |
18892 | Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me? [McGinn] |
12019 | McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity [Forbes,G on McGinn] |
6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
9240 | Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt] |
4718 | If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
10269 | Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam] |
6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
9169 | A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam] |
5819 | Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam] |
6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
6171 | Beliefs are states of the head that explain behaviour, and also items with referential truth-conditions [McGinn] |
6284 | If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true? [Putnam] |
22413 | Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn] |
22415 | Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn] |
22416 | Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn] |
22422 | Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn] |
22428 | You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn] |
22414 | You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn] |
22423 | Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn] |
22426 | We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn] |
22412 | Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn] |
22421 | Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn] |
22424 | Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn] |
22425 | The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn] |
7629 | We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn] |
17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
6273 | Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough [Putnam] |
6274 | Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion [Putnam] |
6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
7620 | Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself [Putnam] |
18960 | Most predictions are uninteresting, and are only sought in order to confirm a theory [Putnam] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
14204 | Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change [Putnam] |
17084 | You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects [Putnam] |
4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn] |
7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
2590 | Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam] |
3460 | Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle] |
2591 | Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam] |
2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
5495 | Instances of pain are physical tokens, but the nature of pain is more abstract [Putnam, by Lycan] |
2331 | Functionalism says robots and people are the same at one level of abstraction [Putnam] |
2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
7388 | McGinn invites surrender, by saying it is hopeless trying to imagine conscious machines [Dennett on McGinn] |
2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
2344 | If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam] |
6376 | Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam] |
2330 | If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim] |
3185 | Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn] |
2074 | Can we give a scientific, computational account of folk psychology? [Putnam] |
7611 | Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing [Putnam] |
22420 | The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn] |
18410 | Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn] |
22417 | Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn] |
18402 | Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn] |
2605 | If everything uses mentalese, ALL concepts must be innate! [Putnam] |
2606 | No machine language can express generalisations [Putnam] |
4099 | If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane] |
12026 | We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam] |
3208 | Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey] |
14200 | 'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this [Putnam] |
2343 | Reference may be different while mental representation is the same [Putnam] |
9168 | I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam] |
5820 | 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam] |
7612 | Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam] |
7613 | Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences [Putnam] |
6282 | Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference [Putnam] |
2346 | Meaning and translation (which are needed to define truth) both presuppose the notion of reference [Putnam] |
4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn] |
6281 | Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam] |
6278 | We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam] |
2354 | "Meaning is use" is not a definition of meaning [Putnam] |
2336 | Holism seems to make fixed definition more or less impossible [Putnam] |
2334 | Meaning holism tried to show that you can't get fixed meanings built out of observation terms [Putnam] |
2335 | Understanding a sentence involves background knowledge and can't be done in isolation [Putnam] |
6271 | How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam] |
2340 | We should separate how the reference of 'gold' is fixed from its conceptual content [Putnam] |
2341 | Like names, natural kind terms have their meaning fixed by extension and reference [Putnam] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
2338 | Reference (say to 'elms') is a social phenomenon which we can leave to experts [Putnam] |
14202 | Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference [Putnam] |
9170 | We need to recognise the contribution of society and of the world in determining reference [Putnam] |
14201 | Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term [Putnam] |
2339 | Aristotle implies that we have the complete concepts of a language in our heads, but we don't [Putnam] |
3893 | Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton] |
6268 | The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions [Putnam] |
6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
22418 | I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn] |
5817 | Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam] |
6279 | A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam] |
6270 | The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour [Putnam] |
6283 | Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways) [Putnam] |
14206 | There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct' [Putnam] |
6275 | You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs [Putnam] |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
9228 | Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt] |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
9238 | Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt] |
7624 | The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam] |
9232 | It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt] |
9234 | If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt] |
9229 | What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt] |
9233 | Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt] |
9235 | Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt] |
9236 | Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt] |
9237 | The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt] |
9239 | I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt] |
9227 | We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt] |
9230 | People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt] |
9241 | Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt] |
9300 | Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt] |
9231 | Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt] |
11191 | The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |
2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |
11192 | If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE] |
11190 | Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam] |
5818 | If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam] |
6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |