Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Harry G. Frankfurt, Michael J. Sandel and Franciscus Toletus

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57 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel]
Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel]
Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel]
Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Kant's moral law has no foundation - because that would undermine its priority [Sandel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Choosers in the 'original position' have been stripped of most human characteristics [Sandel, by Tuckness/Wolf]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel]
A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Passion for progress is always short-lived [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Conservatives are either individualistic, or communal [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Modern liberal rights in democracies protect individuals against the majority [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals say rights always come first, and justice is neutral on social values [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The self is 'unencumbered' if it can abandon its roles and commitments without losing identity [Sandel, by Shorten]
Liberal justice means the withdrawal of the self, as transcendental or as unencumbered [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Liberalism concerns rights, and communitarianism concerns the common good [Sandel, by Avineri/De-Shalit]
Modern liberalism fails to articulate a vision of the common good [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
I can't defend the view that the majority values of a community are thereby right [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
If persons define themselves by a group membership, insults to that group are a real harm [Sandel]
In the liberal view an insult to my group doesn't hurt me, since I'm defined by choices not groups [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel]
Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel]
Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel]
Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel]
Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel]
Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The case for religious liberty depends on the religion contributing to a morally good life [Sandel]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel]