Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Harry G. Frankfurt, Robert S. Wolf and Critolaus

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43 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
A 'tautology' must include connectives [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Deduction Theorem: T∪{P}|-Q, then T|-(P→Q), which justifies Conditional Proof [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
Universal Generalization: If we prove P(x) with no special assumptions, we can conclude ∀xP(x) [Wolf,RS]
Universal Specification: ∀xP(x) implies P(t). True for all? Then true for an instance [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
Existential Generalization (or 'proof by example'): if we can say P(t), then we can say something is P [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / e. Axiom of the Empty Set IV
Empty Set: ∃x∀y ¬(y∈x). The unique empty set exists [Wolf,RS]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
Comprehension Axiom: if a collection is clearly specified, it is a set [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
In first-order logic syntactic and semantic consequence (|- and |=) nicely coincide [Wolf,RS]
First-order logic is weakly complete (valid sentences are provable); we can't prove every sentence or its negation [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory reveals the structures of mathematics [Wolf,RS]
Model theory 'structures' have a 'universe', some 'relations', some 'functions', and some 'constants' [Wolf,RS]
Model theory uses sets to show that mathematical deduction fits mathematical truth [Wolf,RS]
First-order model theory rests on completeness, compactness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An 'isomorphism' is a bijection that preserves all structural components [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
The LST Theorem is a serious limitation of first-order logic [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
If a theory is complete, only a more powerful language can strengthen it [Wolf,RS]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Most deductive logic (unlike ordinary reasoning) is 'monotonic' - we don't retract after new givens [Wolf,RS]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
An ordinal is an equivalence class of well-orderings, or a transitive set whose members are transitive [Wolf,RS]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Modern mathematics has unified all of its objects within set theory [Wolf,RS]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]