Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Harry G. Frankfurt, Stuart Glennan and David van Reybrouck

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40 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan]
Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan]
Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan]
17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan]
Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Nowadays sovereignty (once the basis of a state) has become relative [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
Today it seems almost impossible to learn the will of the people [Reybrouck]
There are no united monolothic 'peoples', and no 'national gut feelings' [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Technocrats may be efficient, but they lose legitimacy as soon as they do unpopular things [Reybrouck]
Technocrats are expert managers, who replace politicians, and can be long-term and unpopular [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the best compromise between legitimacy and efficiency [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
A referendum result arises largely from ignorance [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
You don't really govern people if you don't involve them [Reybrouck]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
In the 18th century democratic lots lost out to elections, that gave us a non-hereditary aristocracy [Reybrouck]
Representative elections were developed in order to avoid democracy [Reybrouck]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan]