Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hastings Rashdall, Jonathan D. Jacobs and J.M.E. McTaggart

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29 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Substance has to exist, with no intrinsic qualities or relations [McTaggart]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs]
Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 6. Ideal Utilitarianism
Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle]
A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe]
The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall]
Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG]