Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hastings Rashdall, Scott Soames and Plutarch

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Replacing timbers on Theseus' ship was the classic illustration of the problem of growth and change [Plutarch]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
The sun is always bright; it doesn't become bright when it emerges [Plutarch]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
Some philosophers say the soul is light [Plutarch]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / c. Self as brain controller
Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Some say emotion is a sort of reason, and others say virtue concerns emotion [Plutarch]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Being manly and brave is the result of convention, not of human nature [Plutarch]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Animals don't value pleasure, as they cease sexual intercourse after impregnation [Plutarch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 6. Ideal Utilitarianism
Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Animals have not been led into homosexuality, because they value pleasure very little [Plutarch]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall]
Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
People report seeing through rocks, or over the horizon, or impossibly small works [Plutarch]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Absurd superstitions make people atheist, not disharmony in nature [Plutarch]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch]