Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hastings Rashdall, Slavoj Zizek and Wilson,G/Schpall,S

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

25 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
9777 Kant was the first philosopher [Zizek]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
9778 There is no dialogue in philosophy [Zizek]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
9779 Philosophy is transcendental questioning (not supporting science or constructing ontology) [Zizek]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
9780 Consciousness is a malfunction of evolution [Zizek]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
1457 Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
6674 All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
9781 Tolerance and love are strategies to avoid encountering our neighbours [Zizek]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 6. Ideal Utilitarianism
6673 Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
1458 Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall]
1459 Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG]