26 ideas
8092 | Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin] |
8081 | 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin] |
8085 | Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin] |
8086 | Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin] |
8091 | Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin] |
8089 | Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin] |
8087 | Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin] |
8082 | Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin] |
8072 | Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin] |
8075 | Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin] |
19558 | Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S] |
19561 | We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S] |
19563 | The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S] |
19560 | Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S] |
12893 | Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S] |
12896 | Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S] |
12894 | There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S] |
19559 | Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S] |
8088 | People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin] |
1457 | Morality requires a minimum commitment to the self [Rashdall] |
8073 | How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin] |
8076 | The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin] |
6674 | All moral judgements ultimately concern the value of ends [Rashdall] |
6673 | Ideal Utilitarianism is teleological but non-hedonistic; the aim is an ideal end, which includes pleasure [Rashdall] |
1458 | Conduct is only reasonable or unreasonable if the world is governed by reason [Rashdall] |
1459 | Absolute moral ideals can't exist in human minds or material things, so their acceptance implies a greater Mind [Rashdall, by PG] |