18 ideas
| 23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver] |
| 23147 | Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver] |
| 23144 | Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver] |
| 23148 | Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver] |
| 23150 | Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver] |
| 6004 | The cardinal virtues are theoretical (based on knowledge), and others are 'non-theoretical' [Hecato, by Dorandi] |
| 23149 | If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver] |
| 8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
| 8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
| 8416 | Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley] |
| 8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
| 8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
| 8418 | Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley] |
| 8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
| 8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
| 8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
| 8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
| 8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |