Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Helen Cartwright, Jonathan Wolff and Harry G. Frankfurt

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56 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
A 'singulariser' converts a plural like 'number of' to a syntactically neutral form [Cartwright,H, by Hossack]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J]
Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J]
Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J]
Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J]
It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J]
Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J]
Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J]
A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J]
Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J]
Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J]
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J]
Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J]
If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J]
If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J]